


НЕКОТОРЫЕ ГЛАВЫ ИЗ ТЕОРИИ О НЕОЖИДАННОЙ МИРОВОЙ ИСТОРИИ. ЧАСТЬ II



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Аннотация

Триумфальный путь развития социального государства породил легитимный характер новой социальной и ментальной реальности. Дальнейший упадок социального государства также породил новую реальность, при которой стало происходить накопление разнообразных легитимностей, связанных с расцветом неолиберализма. Третий Путь – это своеобразный ответ социал-демократии на новую политическую ситуацию в мире, сложившуюся после 1989 года, ответ, который предполагал создание некоего долгосрочного партнерства сторонников социального государства с неолиберальным режимом, устанавливающим новый гегемонистский экономический и политический миропорядок.

Либерализм рассматривается в современных дискуссиях как выражение определенной системы ценностей. В настоящее время наибольшее внимание уделяется новому монетаристскому или экономическому либерализму. Социализм 70-х и 80-х годов был тем объектом, против которого объединились классический политический либерализм прав человека и новый монетаристский либерализм. Сторонники социального государства не смогли распознать эту новую ситуацию.

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Далее мы выдвигаем гипотезу о существовании трех «обществ» в современном глобальном мире. «Первое общество» – это общество до 1989 года, для которого главной ценностью выступало развитие социального государства. «Второе общество» мы определяем как отрицание «первого», то есть как общество господства монетаристского неолиберализма. Основы для появления «третьего общества» мы видим в новом политическом классе или элите. «Третье общество» возникает как возрождение некоторых черт «первого общества». «Второе общество», возникшее после 1989 года, в настоящее время испытывает первые глобальные потрясения, связанные с возникновением нового мирового порядка.

Ключевые слова:

глобализация, государство всеобщего благосостояния, третий путь, монетаризм, неолиберализм, государственный департамент, различие, саморазрушительное измерение глобализации, три общества глобального времени.

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SOME CHAPTERS FROM A THEORY ABOUT AN UNEXPECTED WORLD HISTORY. PART II

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Abstract

The triumphant way of the social state in the direction of the providing of a legitimacy constituted a new social and mental reality. This is for us much relevant because the decline of the social state also produced a new reality. Like during the construction of the social state, an accumulation of the miscellaneous legitimizations goes on, it was therefore necessary to bring on the scene the same entire pallet of the delegitimization. The Third Way

is the answer of the social democracy to the new situation. An answer that offers a long-term partnership, if we want, a political marriage to the neoliberalism of an economical and political world order, which is already considered as hegemonic.

The liberalism appears in every point and as a personification of every value in the current discussions. The greatest problem in the present to set the liberalism identical to the monetarist economical system. Precisely the really existing socialism of the 70-s and 80-s averred as the subject against which a classical political liberalism of the human rights and a new economical liberalism could unit. The real socialism has not “misunderstood” this new situation. It has simply not recognized it.

We draw further up a hypothesis about three “societies” of actual global world. The first society would be the society of the good will itself, for which the value-oriented life of this year (1989) can no more become an open problem. We define the second society as the one, which is fundamentally not constituted by the above described good will. We see the third society in that political class or elite, which power has been built on the year 1989.

The “third” society is the object of the self-identification of the “first”, the “first” is the product of the year 1989. The “second” society lived after 1989 rather long in the shade, its emancipation began after the first elementary shakes of the new world order.

Keywords:

globalization, welfare state, Third Way, Monetarism, Neoliberalism, state dept, the difference, self-destructive dimension of the globalization, three societies of global time.

Real Globalization

The more the global processes get their global character, the more they acquire “clearly” functional characteristics in their operations. The more obviously global the world economy structure becomes, the more clearly the functional theoretical definitions prevail. From a theoretical aspect, functional and non-functional elements are heterogenic; but from a practical aspect, they fit to one another in an organic and homogeneous manner.

The globalization is therefore not a new, yet unknown center of power, nor a world-government, but in principle it is a qualitatively new system of the relations for all actors. One of its specific traits is an opportunity of access to the global processes and networks in a rather “democratic” way. It would make sense to describe a fundamental phenomenon of the globalization with the criteria of access and accessibility. But this is also the field where we may find two weakest points of the globalization. The globalization demolishes a whole range of particular differences and limits by ensuring it in principle the total accessibility. Therefore, this is a “democratic” way: the participation in the global processes could even outline a new concept of “equality”. The globalization, built on elements of discrimination in its dynamic progress, would not only be a contradiction in the theoretical sense but also in the practical one.

The historical balance of the globalization should prevail in this connection. This balance will depend on final proportions between democracy, accessibility

and discriminative moments, or self-destructive social processes. The globalization establishes new relations in a qualitative and manifold sense; a new character of relations is made up right by the fact that mediums and strata, which used to separate individuals from the global affairs, dropped out and now individuals can directly access the multi-faceted communication of global networks. Another side of this medal is the question of really new resources of globalization, which could be able to ensure the increasing demands for accessibility. The triumphant breakthrough of globalization increases the number of resources by itself but to a much smaller extent than the possible “amount of resources” required for the world of more and more perfect accessibility. The fail of access requirements namely critically deforms the well-built system of global networks.

In respect to social capital, we have to mention a tendency of a “downward spiral”, which is induced by the globalization and which means that the types of social capital, invested into individuals, are reduced both in quality and quantity. We are not trying to ignore the numerous impressive civilizing accomplishments, “success stories” of the globalization. But just actually manifested structural characteristics of the globalization are the cause of the fact, that the upward spiral of great accomplishments and the downward spiral of the social capital do not cross each other. The knowledge component, that operates in the modern production, is part of a broader concept of the knowledge capital, while the social capital, which is invested in successive generations, does not reproduce itself on the level of the human civilization. This also means, that the future will become the field of a new battle of civilization and barbarism, even if none of the definitions of these terms remind of the concepts of civilization or barbarism, that ever occurred in history.

By 1989, the logic of neoliberal identity and difference exchanged the basic notions of the identity and difference. This means, that neither the solidarity of the socialism, nor the brotherly love of Christianity can diminish the brutal power of the difference. The neoliberal identity consists in nothing else but the unconditioned respect and guarantee of freedom and rights of an individual (whose rights might become merely formal at a certain extent of the social differences). In such cases, the difference is not a value or ideology, but it might even become an essential element of the social existence. The logic of difference is only seemingly a victory. It provides equal chances and ranks for the sides involved in it, but actually it is a contra-productive end. It is so, because this logic justifies the Other and Otherness without setting a differentiated identity from both poles of the Otherness on the basis of common value priorities.

The self-destructive society is a new and extensive reality of these days and it calls for the reformulation of the fundamental notions of the social life. In this framework, it would be in principle necessary to analyze actual relationship of the globalization and politics as specific social activities. This would follow from the fact that the present politics is not the same as a few decades ago. The politics, the political subsystem and the political classes slowly seem to find their proper place in the network of the relations of the globalization.

The present model of the world is considered as a mature form of the globalization, that has a decisive specific trait: the phenomenon of the state debt, which fundamentally defines an economic and political framework of the globalization and which is fundamental in the development of the deeply monetarist profile of the present globalization. This is the general model, which the extremely extensive

process of accession to the EU is taking place in. These multiple functions cause that even the lack of a theory has its own victims, even though it hardly ever gets into the center of the debate.

One of the great issues of the future is made up therefore by the problems of the state. The starting point is the relationship between globalization and the nation-state. The political public consciousness is aware of the new tensions and problems of competence, that arise here. From the viewpoint of the state, the regulation of the political and economical processes is also an important element. Therefore, their results are of great importance. The great dimension of the future (and the range of questions to be solved) springs from the fact, that the state is not a neutral actor, that can be only defined by functional characteristics, but the modern state after 1945 undertook civilizing and overall social tasks, in extreme extent totally unknown before, tasks that can only be drawn out of the bounds of the state, shattered by the processes of globalization by destroying huge “areas” in the social network. In this process, the states are the losers.

The real stake of this phenomenon is that the criticism (and even suspicion) of rationalism mostly rises because the emancipation does not take place; in other words, the absence of emancipation might critically endanger the process of rationalization itself. The same way does absolutely refer to the liberalism in the political sphere.

Would we look at the globalization exclusively from the political or exclusively from the economical point of view, we would not have anything specific in front of us. The globalization appears from the (exclusive) vision of the political as a democratic-theoretical problem, in which not only nothing specific or particular is to be found, but the same as an apotheosis of the democratic establishment, an apology in the sense of the wrongly understood Francis Fukuyama (Fukuyama, 1992). The self-destructive globalization appears from this (exclusive) point of view as the full and exemplary normality. Further to these results, the question remains, why it earns to take the globalization into account, if it goes on revealing the boring image not only of the full, but also of the exemplary normality.

Its conception of the state is once again not fundamental. Whilst it diminishes its social functions, it establishes a bureaucracy in the sensible monetary-economical fields, which practically never existed in the “normal” democracies. The bureaucracy vanishes in the social field, the bureaucracy flourishes in the fiscal field. With this demolishing of the social sphere, we must always keep in mind the fine difference, that the demolishing due to the indebtedness is not formally carried out by the monetary complex itself. The essential of this act consists however in the fact that the monetary complex is willing to break numerous taboos or to encourage their elimination. It's important to understand the real causal problematic in the coexistence of “self-destructive” globalization and “constructive” modern nation-state. We were and are living in a concrete form of modern state which controlled almost the whole social reproduction and specially the reproduction of the social capital. We must understand, that this does not depend on a special historical form of modern state. The modern etatism is a much broader phenomenon than the totalitarianism or the welfare state. The whole process of the history consists in a consistent line, in which the modern etatism, step by step, acquires the control over the social reproduction (education, public health, etc.).

The globalization is not genuinely directed against the modern etatism, but it changes radically the circumstances, in which the modern state functions. For

the modern etatism it is like a natural catastrophe. and because the whole process of the social reproduction was already mediated by the modern etatism, the globalization became the natural catastrophe also for the modern societies. The states are therefore the losers in this process. They took over the responsibility of the whole social reproduction, but because of the global integration of great functional systems and markets, they were no more capable of the fulfilling there responsibilities. This is the historical moment of the indebtedness of the state. Neither the traditional forecast, nor the traditional consensus-making, nor the traditional bureaucratism (administration), nor other traditional institutes are apt or able to legitimately develop the competence. There is the national (state) debt without the globalization, there might also be the globalization without any national (state) debt.

The action field of the economy (above all, the one of the multinational groups) has hugely increased in the globalization and put on its feet the specifically monetary concretization of the global deep structures of an economy. This took off, still more intensely, the carpet of the tangible evidence of the increasing national indebtedness. Under such circumstances, values are changing. Neither the state nor the society will be able to carry out and manage the reproduction at the level of the historic period of time even in the model case (and still less in the reality of the international relations, the international competition, the universal communication and the unequal contest). The various members of the society will always have more reduced possibilities to lead, with their own forces, their own destiny or the situation of the society to a better condition. The value-producing work does no longer determine in principle the social existence.

The already accumulated civilisation and humanistic values are in such a situation not only not increased, that the assurance of their survival usually already becomes a provocative problem. The crisis is therefore, so trivially it may sound, essentially a crisis of the private economy, which goes together with a lot of losses and disadvantages. These losses increase, however, the responsibilities of the state already indebted before the crisis. A crisis of the (world) economy is practically identical with a potent crisis of the (nation-) state.

This context manifests itself very saliently in the post-socialist world. Since these states (now strictly speaking of them as states) have had to solve two tasks fundamentally opposed to each other. On the one hand, it was their historical task to develop a solid democratically working system. On the other hand, they also had to try to reduce the multiple differences between this sphere and the Western Europe, when they had not to get also through gradually. The national indebtedness overwhelming this process from the beginning made the resolution of these both tasks, opposed to each other, almost impossible. If we again include the consequences of the worldwide economical crisis, we then may require the metaphor according to which, the once already increased crisis of the state was once again increased, namely through the post-socialist factor.

If the worldwide economical crisis puts the indebted state in every hemisphere in front of a multiplied proportion of challenges, this proportion, in the case of the post-socialist world, may increase again. This situation designs the contours of a new focus of the condition humaine of the globalized and self-destructive world, the one of the social survival. The crisis is therefore finally only an increase of a long-term process, which lasted during the time of the whole history of the hitherto global-

ized world, without having been fully identical with this history. It means also, that the enormous change in the context of and in relation with the neoliberalism also then should have to be reflected and perceived, if eventually the worldwide economical crisis does not break out. The crisis is then not the symptom of a structurally strongly charged global development, but – essentially – the continuation and the provisory end of this development, and as such, with all probability, still the introduction of a new independent phase of the global development.

After its world-historical victory, the neoliberalism stood as a regulator and moviens of the global development on the ideological-political world stage only. As an hegemony, it embodies the mutation of the earlier liberalism and the dialectic of the earlier modern age. Straight as an hegemony, it cannot however also go past the necessity and responsibility of emphasizing the new forms of emancipation. The new forms of the pseudo-emancipation are almost noticeable. They play then their role, which by no means must be underestimated, even in the current worldwide economical crisis. In this finance- and credit system crisis, the demand also became namely the focus of attention. This dimension can be identified in its core as a necessity of welfare and this need can be distinguished – hardly essentially – from the imitation of the original necessity of emancipation. We see therefore in the necessity of welfare an expression of a desire for emancipation.

Constructivity and Descriptivity in the New Globalization

Among the international relationships, the specifically imperial relations can be distinguished through the principle of the each other guided competition or rivalry of the diverse actor-states in the framework of a paramount global cooperation. The attribute “imperial” is neither a random nor a traditional description, that connects with each other phenomena of similar character timeless, without any further qualification (Schumpeter, 1919).

“Imperial” means, in our context, a specifically new relation and condition, that are somewhat described in Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. It can also be understood, that the globalization can today be nearly characterized and addressed not only through this relation, although its increasing importance can no longer be put into question mainly somewhat after 2000. The visible validity, let alone supremacy of the imperial discourse is also therefore an excellent perspective on the globalization, because the basic sensibilities of the globalization do not define at all its significance from the beginning, on the contrary, the relevance of the order of magnitude of the imperial discourse is itself equivalent with an attribute of the respective state of the globalization.

The imperial dimensions can of course also change through the rapid development, partly in their absolute conditions, partly in their relations to the other forms of the global discourse, i.e. to these perspectives, from which the globalization can be interpreted and understood also independently. Since the actorial dimensions, i.e. the action space of the diverse protagonists in the global processes are unchanged of high importance, this actorial freedom can also on its part increase, in a striking way, the order of magnitude of the imperial dimension amongst the other dimensions. in the context of the imperial dimension, a mixture of objective and subjective actions spaces is thus arising, which constant interweaving can be regarded as one of the leading conditions of the globalization.

The rapid changes in the imperial dimensions of the process of globalization are very characteristic of this event from the beginning. It goes so far, that in the first years after 1989, the imperial dimension has not been at all thematized publicly, the euphoria of the “end of the history” promised a world, where the traditional imperial relations have become, as for ever, obsolete (Fukuyama, 1992). The conscious profiling of the individual virtual or real global imperial actors is joining this starting situation.

Our thought process is concerned with this new phenomenon of the mutual competition of the global “empires”. On the one hand, it is about, we repeat it, a competition, that realizes as secondary phenomenon behind the phenomenon of a multi-strata global cooperation on the first line. But this phenomenon, also as a competition of all against all, is revealing quite complex and multiple. This rivalry does not call into question the validity of the reality and the relevance of the primary global cooperation. This competition of the second line adopts often the outline of asymmetrical forms.

This basic situation (global cooperation and in principle comprehensive rivalry and multiple competition of all against all in the second line) is inextricably linked, in our age, with the reality of the globalization (Kiss, 2000, 2010a, 2010b). Every possible similarity to former world-historical or international relationships is basically misleading. This competition of the second line is, in its true definitions, a quite new phenomenon. The pure existence of these rivalries in the second line already means a fundamental change in the experience and interpretation of war and peace, for this competition personifies a permanent debate, which can much more easily go over to a symbolic or limited war problematic, as it seemed still possible in the past.

First, we concentrate on the question, to whose expense this struggle of the second line is led. The burdens and costs of wars and crises are transferred in the rule to the “society”, it is also not different with the “risks” of the modern industrial societies, what is finally a consequence of the state and of the great economical and financial actors. This rivalry on the second line includes obviously the domain of the economy, however we include economical phenomena and facts only if it can be proved about such phenomenon or such fact, that it results from conscious strategical reflections. We can only develop and interpret this rivalry through facts, which origin is secured. It follows, that we will have to deal with a huge number of facts. Do we take again the universal global cooperation as starting fact (“first line”), it becomes then comprehensible, why this conflict can be conceived, on the “second line” also as a war of a new type. This rivalry is not characterized by combating armed forces. This rivalry is rather determined by the idea of weakening if possible the opponent (some opponents, all opponents), would it be about his concrete, but also symbolic or virtual weakening. If this expression has a current sense, in this new context and terrain having to be compared with no former context, these conflicts are oriented, in the second line, against the hinterland of the competitors. This means however, that the individual actors in competition do not attack the elites or the ruling class of the other actors, rather their “hinterland”, or the everyday life and the conditions of reproduction. Would it be effectively the case, then the purely theoretical question is first put, whether this phenomenon is distinguishing from the many similar phenomena of the world history. This phenomenon must be considered, through the fact of the globalization and the also relevant fact of the universal cooperation (the “first” line), necessarily as a genuinely new phenomenon.

It is quite difficult to discuss the real facticity of these conflicts. An economical success, the changes in the prices of raw materials, the movements of the stock exchange and of the markets can improve the positions of one actor at the expense of the other(s). These conflicts, we accept it now, do not disturb the global communication and the global cooperation (the “first line”), they are often not lived as conflicts, while they can cause concrete and violent damages. This asymmetrical war is thus also simultaneously a silent war, which victims or those damaged often do not know themselves, whom they fell victim to¹.

The assumption of this mutual rivalry of the “imperial” actors can extend to a somewhat modified vision also on arms production and commerce. This leads however also further into the experience, that the global circumstances and relationships are changing between the politics and the economics again in a new context. For, precisely the arms commerce must not be differently interpreted than a moment of this competition in the second line, even if it is carried out from “purely economical” moments. The supposed and hypothetical role of victim of the hinterland is realizing in this context again very sharply: if these guns are needed, then this role is clear (for, no population can be today kept away from these conflicts), if not, then (and we remain now only with this single consequence), the costs of the arms are taken from other sections of the budget. It is also similar with the concurrence of the representations! Events, such as the Olympics in China, winter Olympics in Russia or a football World Cup in Brazil, are certainly considered as rational steps (amongst others also) in the rivalry of global actors in the so-called second line of the international reality of the age of the globalization. It is however just as clear, that the costs of these mega-events of the global representations are ascribed to the account of the populations. These examples show also, that this competition of the second line is also revealing as a medium, which can appropriate to itself and instrumentalize also events, emerging totally independent on it.

The problem of the energy and energy supply shows however also a type of events, in which the decisive (intentionally guided) or random (spontaneous) actions could hardly more distinguish definitely from each other. In these domains, we can literally make no step, without having also any influence on other actors, what already alone, like autopoietically brings the state of the competition of the second member on the scene. This type is also that, which shows always publicly the everyday reality of this rivalry, which then – enhanced through the force of the digitalization and the approaches of a society of information – strengthens the impression of the mutual global rivalry at the expense of the global cooperation existing already in itself.

Peculiar sides of this mutual struggle are, if individual actors set for themselves certain coordinates, orders of magnitude and norms, that they consider them as pain threshold of the others in this universal and permanent conflict. So, we can for example read in the drone attacks, that another imperial actor wants to avoid to enlist in the Chinese airspace, because it assumes, that China would not tolerate it. Another

¹ An interesting confirmation of this assumption of the mutual rivalry in the second line can be so, if inside the cooperating global structure of these imperial actors other coalitions are emerging, which *feel themselves closer to each other than versus the others*, for this consideration seems to have already taken into account the fact, that this rivalry causes damages to the others (with the closer approach, these can certainly be moderated).

side of the same dimension consists in the support to the civil-, women's and other social movements (social media!) on the sovereign territory of other imperial actors, in which also blurred borders of influences are established. For us, this phenomenon has the above-average importance, that such steps and opinions can apply as indirect confirmation of our thesis.

A very particular place is coming in this very concretely conceived conflict of the global empires of the mass communication and of the mass culture. That these be since ever already international, and can be prevented in their nature only through the force, is a fundamental fact. That this rivalry of individual global protagonists happens in them thousands of times, is another important fundamental fact. The difficulty and simultaneously the theoretical interest of this domain consist in the extensive infinity of this domain, in its confusion, but also not less in the considerable asymmetry, that exists under this aspect among the individual global players, while the American mass culture influences much more clearly the other great empires as it is the case in reverse order, even if this effect can also not be considered as unlimited or unilateral. The mass culture does not only mediate the own and the other "world", but in several genres also "works up" and thematizes another world. On working up the essential problems of the other empire, several variations of interpretation can appear, every civilization is working on the fundamental problems of the other, like it was formerly the case in Charlie Chaplin's and Leslie Howard's films on the Third Reich or Andrzej Wajda's films on the Stalinism.

In sign of the universal rivalry of the individual civilizations, multiple and very strange phenomena can also outgrow from this problematic. This signals, in an interesting way, (as one of many phenomena) a reaction on an American film presently shot about Che Guevara, in which it was affirmed, "the others relate our history". There are however examples for that, which one global "empire" calls into question the right to exist of the other, like it happens often, in an astonishing way, between the USA and America (for instance : America = Mars, Europe = Venus). In this communication, some individual real dimensions of this mutual conflict of individual empires are however also thematical, like for example in the matter of relationship between Europe and North-Africa, or in the discussion about to what extent the EU interventions should support the individual member-states in other places of the world. In this analysis, a point is also visible, that would be even not noticed from another starting point. If it is really about the responsibilities of the "hinterland", it becomes then soon visible, that this concept means something quite different in Europe than in all other great global units. Europe's "base" consists of individual nation-states, that partly protect their sovereignty, partly have abandoned it. This known fact can become relevant in the new context of the competition of the global empires in the second line. If we already stay at the level of the damages, it is then already quite fundamental to expect, that they can be unevenly distributed only because of this fact. Here, we want to mention briefly the European politics of education and school, where the university shows surely itself as a terrain, on which the rivalry of the individual great player (behind the comprehensive global cooperation) is running intensely.

At this point, let us leave aside, whether the European politics of higher education is meaningful or not (for us: not). The chosen strategy in the conflict revealed however undoubtedly as a strategy, which disadvantages and losses are not distributed evenly among the individual states. This difference can also be generalized. In Europe,

it is therefore possible, that the negative consequences of the rivalry of the second line be unequally redistributed to individual member-states! If we think of the rivalry of the philosophies of life, religions and ideologies, we would so spontaneously think, that only quite few ideologies take part in this great competition. It is however not the case. In truth, there are many more ideologies in the global world, which are fighting each other and each of these ideologies has also inwards a rich differentiation, that fights also now inside the same major ideology or religion.

The convincing impression, that Huntington's Clash of Civilizations was a self-realizing prophecy, that influenced in its way the events, came mostly from the strange and somewhat instilling fear experience, that this "struggle" came together with that result, that every ideology or philosophy of life "fundamentalized" with consequences, i.e. in case of every individual ideology gave rise to the more fundamentalist or the most fundamentalist variation (Huntington, 1996). Thus, the fundamentalism entered a new phase of its history, with which also a new history, a new sociology and also a new sociology of the knowledge of the fundamentalism became necessary.

A development occurred, which in a peculiar way had also moved closer to each other the individual philosophies of life or ideologies. Simultaneously, some fundamentalist thought structures became so general, that larger groups and masses, in many countries and in many sociological circles, do no longer recognize exactly the fundamentalist color of their mode of thinking and just use the fundamentalism, like they applied formerly the constructive thought structures, they use even now the fundamentalist structures to solve factual problems. In the duality of such empires, the ideological and civilizational clash can show through with great ease, the difference between communism and post-communism is, for such reasons, also not made with sufficient care, while China is still classified, sometimes communist, sometimes neo-liberal in these double-level becoming confrontations (empires + ideologies). Also the eventual differences between America and Europe are looking already for "ideological" marks, where one part must always ideologically (i.e. democracy-theoretically) stand above the other, even if the criteria of this civilizational superiority are absolutely relative and no longer show the unambiguity of the year 1989.

The imperial conflicts of second line (behind the global cooperation, that constitutes the first line) adopt in any of their constitutions always clear ideological-philosophical forms. These ideologies and these philosophies of life are adopting very generally (as it has been once pointed out) a "fundamentalis" character, what has also to be explained from this competition. It is almost alarming, that this process represents the counter-movement toward the development after 1945, while formerly the individual ideologies/philosophies of life became always more differentiated and demanding. No doubt, this movement is also to explain with the rivalry of the individual global empires, in which leading ideologies anyway are often really very close to the fundamentalism, it is however to explain also with the ever decreasing role, that the really independent intellectuals play in the process of formation of these ideological concepts.

This growth carries in itself two dangers to consider seriously. The correspondence – relation of an "empire" with a "civilization" (philosophy of life/religion) represents such a striking (!) and amazing simplification of our hyper-complex world, which must be in itself identified, through the scale of this simplification, directly as the highest danger. This simplification is somewhat as we would really think, that

the Roman Empire consisted of Romans, who represented the civilization/philosophy of life/religion of the Roman Empire! This extreme simplification operated up to now and will, most probably in the future, also work as a self-fulfilling prophecy. The concrete orientation of this prophecy is already alone a negative and self-destructive one. If one “empire” interprets the plural, multi-strata, modern reality of the other as fundamentalism, it follows then necessarily, that the own society considers itself also as fundamentalism, possibly emphasizes and supports in itself the own, fundamentalist trains².

From these virtual processes, a concept of the enemy occurs already each time. Both fundamentalistically colored empires can experiment the others as “enemies”, depending on the intensity of formation of the concept of the enemy of the own philosophy of life. No today politician is to blame for the fact that every other philosophy (of life) is an enemy, he is, so to speak, constrained to experiment, at a certain stage of the self-fulfilling prophecy, the other as an enemy.

Another consequence of this danger of the link of the rivalry of the empires with the rivalry of the ideologies consists in the easily understandable fact, that on this basis the mechanisms of the positive feedback must work. The perception of this now doubled rivalry leads necessarily to the acceleration and intensification of conflicts among the individual great actors. This rapidity can, under some circumstances, be a rapidity, to which we are not prepared and that possibly can also not be perceived in the normal everyday world.³ This danger exists quite concretely in the fact, that the launch of the civilizational struggle in the imperial rivalry represents a critical, if not just an irreversible change. The universal rivalry of the global “empires” is also part of the real politology, is rational to interpret and might be even also addressed as trivial event. It is therefore of socio-ontological nature, even if it does not maybe please us. The truly tragic consequences of the penetration of the civilizational struggles consists in the fact, that the ideologies grant the struggle of the great empires new qualities, they make of this struggle a new reality, a no longer controllable irrational world situation can arise from a politically and socio-ontologically “normal” situation.

The mutual rivalry in the second line of the globalization can engage new “double antagonisms” through this link with the struggle of the civilizations. Since the “fundamentalization” *mutatis mutandis* is going forward in the inner life of every great empire, a confrontation between “fundamentalism” and “correct democracy” arises from these double positions.

We must here point out the again very problematic side, that, while in the “West” the anti-communism is the opposing fundamentalism № 1 (Baudrillard, 1986), in the fundamentalist “East” (i.e. in the concrete empires, we count there), the anti-liberalism is the concept of enemy № 1. The juxtaposition of both these “fundamental” facts prepares considerable dangers for the further development. For, the role distri-

² That by the way such inner trains seeming fundamentalist at the age of the crisis and of the self-destructive society of indebted states occur as alone, goes even without saying.

³ It is about unsuccessful individuation processes, break of traditions, economic crisis, unemployment, disappointment because of political systems, that are only exacerbated by the modern social and non-social communication, so that in this acceleration they can even have archaic, modern and postmodern moments equal to their importance.

bution has the common train, that neither in the “West” (in the here concerned great actors), nor in the “East” (in the here concerned great actors), the fundamentalism is the concept of enemy № 1. This contributes to another acceleration of the dynamics, if not of the dialectic of the fundamentalism. In this relation of the “West” to the “East”, the West wanted mainly act, with the attraction force of the occidental values, on the population of the East, and also export the democratic institution. We cannot say, that the endeavours remained unsuccessful, even these efforts were however highly hindered by the arising of the clash of civilizations, because they have been just fully politicized and even the clearest values of the democracy and of the emancipation could appear as imperial interests.

This concrete confrontation shows again asymmetrical trains. Thus, a double threat arises from the mutual influences (as rivalry of the second line even from a “normal” fact). The first is directed against the other “civilization”, without forgetting however also the other one, in which the other threat concerns the own population, if it does not understand how to take over, at its level, also the logic of the civilization struggle. In a “fundamentalist” empire, we may not behave “democratically” and in a “democratic” empire, we may not behave “fundamentalistically”, understanding these attitudes, as we just understand them concretely. Any fundamentalism is an organic component of the doubled global rivalry of the “empires”, that must act in a globalization (if not exclusively of “imperial” color). While we have described, at a place, the globalization as dialectic of the modernity, we must categorize the advance of the fundamentalism in this doubled rivalry as dialectic of the fundamentalism.

It seems to us, that this observation could characterize also many other situations in the processes of the today globalization. An open confessional conflict or even a war would also come together with that incalculable damage, that we may think, that the world history would not exist and this (global) confessional war (which is ultimately anything but confessional or civilizational) differs in nothing from the war of the crusaders. That we previously focused on the confrontation of the “West” and of the “East”, does not at all mean, that we had forgotten, that there are quite a lot of “imperial” and “civilizational” conflicts. The effective reality is precisely constituted of a multiplicity of these conflicts. In this “dialectic of the fundamentalism” (which extent is, as said, temporary and hypothetical), we must sensitize, in this domain, in the direction of the “mutual affinities and attractions” (Wahlverwandtschaften) between empires and ideologies.

In the wake of these processes, the individual empires try to find their own (old or new) civilizational ideologies. The same movement can also start from the other end: the organizing civilizational ideologies (that can already occur at this stage also as independent institutions) also try to find their “own” empire, from which they expect, that they will play, in this concrete field, an “exclusive” role. Has the “dialectic of the fundamentalism” effectively somewhat advanced, it is then inevitable, that the democracies be disadvantaged in this competition. in the short term, it is namely questionable, that the attraction force of the democracies in a non-democratic society, or in a state of crisis, could resist with the demagogy or the aggressiveness of the well-organized fundamentalist pressure. It seems to us, that the assumption of Huntington’s option of a Clash of Civilizations was an historical error of the “West”, for the rapid identification with this conception has prevented a more constructive, more communicative and, finally, more human development in the “global” space

of the globalization, already the absence of another way must be considered today as a serious mistake (Ehrke, 2004.). The interpretation of the terrorism is without any doubt a consequence of this politics. This vision hides, on the one hand, the reality, at least in the sense, that this phenomenon is not justified by the doubling of the imperial rivalries in the second line. Drawn from this context, the terrorism can already be multiply interpreted, even if also numerous right moments can also be easily contained in these interpretations. So, the terrorism is on the one hand immeasurably increased. On the other hand, the transformation of the such understood terrorism reveals also in a self-fulfilling prophecy, so that at the end we can just as difficultly make the distinction between the ideological phantom and the reality, such as it has been formerly the case with the Clash of Civilizations. The integration of the Clash of the Civilizations in the (almost obvious) rivalry of the empires of the globalization can accelerate the conflicts in the globalization also thus unexpectedly and critically (Berger & Huntington, 2002).

Thus, a dialectic of the fundamentalism realized. It is apparently the consequence, but in the reality a not necessary consequence, if not just the contrary of the globalization itself. It may no longer be called into question, that thus a true danger appeared.

The Three World Societies

In the neoliberal globalization after 1989, the dichotomy “freedom-repression” is appearing in a new way. On the one side, the thinking is also in itself considerably liberated, while the criteria and dimensions of the real globalization are making almost impossible to construct a specific hermeneutics of the globalization. The everyday real test can be one of the major trains of character of the globalization of our years. If it represents an incarnated cognitive dissonance or an antinomy, or even a contradiction, which both poles are located on considerably different levels of abstraction, we leave that aside. While we want soon to describe the global society also as a “society of the good will”, it is already so much clear, that “the good will”, which is mentioned here and not yet realized, a reaction also of social “splitting” phenomena worth of interest.

After 1989, which date is, according to many considerations, also as the date of beginning of the globalization, it was given to the value-oriented and exigent citizen, to identify themselves with the democratic system and in it also, intensively and all-round, with their own democratic establishment. This honest and intensive identification with the own system was certainly the product of the message of the year 1989, a certain “end of the history”. From a perspective of the increasing temporal distance, this phenomenon of the full identification with the own system reminds of phenomena of the sixties. It is here not about the peak points of the movement of the new Left, rather about the much slower change of values, in which many wanted to live value-oriented, have overcome positions of the new Left of that time, without wanting to have named themselves under the name of Left.

The same attitude belongs also to the history of the invisible transition from the new Left to the neoliberalism (new Liberalism), in other terms, from 1968 up to 1989, on which the author of these lines has also written a lot of studies, without having really thought at that time how much the continuity of this transition will be amazing. Another important heuristic point in a possible reconstruction is that mysterious

modification, of how finally similar contents can be transformed, on the political pallet, from “left” toward “right”. It is a fact, that this process of 1989 of the self-identification with the own system in the soul of this new group of the citizens, wanting to live consciously value-orienting, was going on as it was the case after 1968. The movement of the great world-historical pendulum undoubtedly began already in the midst of the seventies (i.e. still far before 1989). This shows also the sense of the vacuum let by the new Left.

Such a profound, if not intransigent, self-identification with the own society and the own political representatives is a “social fact” in Durkheim’s sense, which must have a range of consequences. One of these consequences is, that it can be an instrument suggesting to the power or to the establishment of such a society to use this situation deeply egoistic. Such an establishment can easy manipulate this profound self-identification, this obvious confidence, to build on this attitude a solid pillar in the political universe. The possibility of the manipulation is at an early stage spontaneous here. It is in principle also from the beginning so, that this intensity of the identification can hand over spontaneously the people concerned at any time to the manipulations of the establishments. This new master-servant relationship emerges therefore immediately after the crystallization of the original basic situation. The best social order is here, the social fact becomes reality. 1989 brought with its credible message a revolution of the good will and the faithful, graceful society. The radical novelty of this manipulation is, that this time it is not aimed at the deprived, the wretched, the poor or social classes, that should be appeased or diverted in the articulation of their real rights and disadvantages. This time manipulating some classes, which are partially satisfied, are identifying themselves with the establishment, are emotionally satisfied with the state of the world and the globalization.

An interpretation of a large historical arch shows the way from the ideally accepted total identification (with the new world) up to the manipulation (not yet quite totally realized). We consider the turning point of the historical credibility of the new establishment of the year 2004 (George W. Bush’s Iraq war) or of the year 2008 (world financial crisis). The positive value-oriented attitude of the year 1989 was no longer really considering its own time as problematic. The positive, quite apologetic train was belonging to its nature. The new culture of the all-round criticism has also not been supplemented by ever new rules of the correct behavior, by ever new rules of the correct speech. Precisely the society of the good thought spontaneously and independently that, in 1989, a qualitative leap in the world history occurred. If one follows this line, one is soon confronted with well-known phenomena of the last decades. The result is striking: in the criticism, already become of second nature, the share of “empiricism”, the sense for reality, has always declined, although that of the criticism grew just as straightforwardly. An attitude of permanent and growing criticism with a shrinking share of empiricism and a shrinking sense for reality is however only possible, if the proportion of manipulation also increases in the overall process.

After the East-European real socialism and the West-European conformism (one must also add to this already the “new” leftist conformism), we may not be surprised, that the stabilization of the criticism as social activity produced a profound enthusiasm, which also led to the self-identification with the own reality, although this establishment might also much recognize, that one can lean largely and perspectively upon this attitude. This is the more profound reason of the already once mentioned proximity,

if not encounter of the culture of the criticism and of the deconstruction issuing from the post-modernism. On this line, manipulation is deconstruction and deconstruction is manipulation. Starting from the birth of a striking attitude which, on the basis of the interpretation of the year 1989, we draw up a hypothesis about three “societies”, that emerged from these sources.

We indicate, that precisely the interpretation of the year 1989 produced these three global “societies”. We take for absolutely actual the existence of these three global societies. The first society would be the society of the good will itself, for which the value-oriented life of this year (1989) can no more become an open problem. We define the second society as the one, which is fundamentally not constituted by the above described good will. In the following, we will try to identify it in this abstract description as the society of the “majority”. We see the third society in that virtual apparatus, political class or elite, global conglomeration, which power has been built on the year 1989 and thus became the concretization of that establishment, with which the “first” society identified itself so totally. This “third” society might surely be defined on the basis of a detailed analysis also as “new class”, however we are not at all so far in the description, and we are also afraid, that this “new class” can be confused with the numerous other “new” classes of the last historical period in the sociological literature.

The three societies are making up a configuration, which is becoming decisive apparent behind the relevant real events. The “third” society is the object of the self-identification of the “first”, the “first” is the product of the year 1989. The “second” society lived after 1989 rather long in the shade, its emancipation began only after the first elementary shakes of the new world order (under “shakes”, we understand the process, in which the self-image and the hopes of the achievements of 1989 had to see themselves confronted to the reality). The “first” society, the one of the “good will” was representing on the long term (with the help of the “third” society, which is the manipulation itself!) as the whole society. It is therefore a great question of the history, of what was and, fundamentally, what does the historical fate of the “second” society become, which is on the way to demonstrate the “majority”, while the “third” society is doing everything to make an example out of the constantly changing groups of the “first” society.

The relations of the three societies are produced also in the milieu, which is defined by the reality of the indebted state. The “third” society suggests often to the “first” society, that the indebted state is not the decisive fact, rather that the demolition of the state is a progress, that is precisely going to meet the individualizing and liberal velleities of the “first” society. The “second” society is however the clear loser in the condition humaine of the indebted state.

For the establishment of the period after 1989, nothing might have been in abstract more profitable than the weakness of the national sphere, which poured out of the indebtedness (and out of no other conditions). The global establishment can appropriate itself everything in these circumstances! It can implement private power plants and private universities, it can buy media or media empires, and it is also largely free from any further state control (because of the globalization, of the media power, and exaggerated personal rights, that grant this class a practically unshakable legal protection).

In the co-ordinated interplay of the “first” and the “third” societies, the “second” society appears constantly and really as “enemy”. It has to be seen so, because for in-

stance the “third” society cannot at all imagine that this society will bear its deprivation, impoverishment and social humiliation without any resistance. For precisely the “third” society knows most exactly which profits of any kind it has already drawn from this change, and it remains nothing but the “first” class to believe in the interpretation models of the “third” society about the nature of the “second” society. So it remains then a simple task of the everyday manipulation.

The three “societies” are living also in the world of the new medias. The communication, the knowledge, the technology of information, the world of the virtuality enable an all-round and rapid exchange of messages. The three “societies” can be excellently classified on the axis of media poverty and media wealth. The “third” society owns the mediality in every sense of the word. It uses the medias to preserve the “first” society in its enthusiasm. The “second” society is not considered as target group, has itself no media, appears in the media mostly as “deserved victim” or as a “potential danger”. The manipulation is kept alive by the “third” class in the interests of a further mastering the “first” class.

The “three” societies are not necessarily developing in their parallelism in the sense, that they once appear in a representative state as three vast comprehensive parties. It seems to us that they are evolving in the direction of three great thought communities, for instance toward three “religions” in a not yet exactly identified sense of the word. Fully roughly outlined: the “first” society goes in the sense of a new and of a new type christianity (“Man is good”), the “second” society is wrapping around a new “religion”, while it wants to escape from the chaos of the new mass culture and of the old resentment. Today, we already know the “religion” of the “third” society: it is “Monte Carlo”, “Alfa Romeo”, “Cayman Island” and “Kalashnikov”. The status of distribution of the media ownership (and its ever-talented use) precisely underlines the importance of Assange and Snowden, this situation creates precisely the right context for their publications. The new sensibility for the empiricism shook the credibility of the “third” society. The “first” society can free itself from the enchantment of the “third” society. The “second” society can breathe deeply, but still has much to suffer until it succeeds in articulating itself positively.

Without difficulty one can see how the deepest debates of our years are concentrated around this virtual and abstract class formation. A possible positioning of the current Left might explain today also great chapters of the real politics. For, on the one hand, the established Left belongs after 2000 to the third class of the “manipulators” (i.e. the elite). On the other hand, the established Left builds without any doubt a strong and independent group of the “society of the good will” (first class). and thirdly, the “second class” remains of course (for instance the “majority”), that was traditionally considered as “left target group”. This tripartition of the real existing Left might explain, why its political articulation is so fragmented. If we were to consider the phenomenon Trump or the alternatives of the current moderated and / or extreme rights in front of the horizon of this new virtual structure, this confrontation would then yield also numerous insights.

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